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My experiences with the ratification ofthe Strategic Anus Reduction Treaty, the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty, and the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty have led me to conclude 
that presenting technical issues early in the process greatly reduces their politicization during the 
ratification end game. This chapter summarizes the important issues that will be raised during the 
debate on ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It uses a compact question and 
answer fonnat to cover the following topics: 1. Nuclear Proliferation, n. Nuclear Arms Control, III. 
Warhead Reliability and Yield for National Security, IV. Warhead Safety, V. Verification, and VI. 
The Verification-Compliance process. Each section begins with a statement of conclusions, fol­
lowed by a set of relevant questions and answers. 
I. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
Conclusions: 
For 40 years, a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has been considered the quid pro 
quo by the 175 non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs) for them to end their sovereign right to 
develop nuclear weapons. Without cooperation by the five nuclear weapon states (NWSs), the 
NNWSs will limit their participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in 
other non-proliferation arenas. The CTBT and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are 
forever politically linked in the global regime to prevent nuclear proliferation by creating a norm 
that outlaws nuclear weapons programs, by negating confidence in untested though unsophisti­
cated weapons, and by preventing development of sophisticated fission and fusion weapons. In 
support of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the NWSs have offered security assurances to the 
NNWSs outside the context of bloc alliances. 
Question L1: Comprehensive Test Ban TreatylNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Linkage 
What language in the NPT, the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), and the Threshold Test 
Ban Treaty (TTBT) links a ban on nuclear testing and the NFT requirement that forbids NNWSs 
from establishing nuclear weapons programs? 
Answer 11: 
LTBT Preamble (1963): "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explo­
sions of nuclear weapons for all time ..." 
*I would like to thank S. Fetter, M. Nordyke, D. Schroeer, Richard Scribner and P. Zimmerman 
for comments on the draft manuscript. 
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NPT (1968) and TTBT (1974) Preambles: "Recalling the detennination expressed 
by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty ... to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all 
test explosions ofnuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this 
end," 
TIBT Resolution ofRatification (September 1990): "... the United States shares a 
special responsibility with the Soviet Union to continue the bilateral Nuclear 
Testing Talks to achieve further limitations on nuclear testing, including the 
achievement ofa verifiable comprehensive test ban." 
Since progress on banning all nuclear tests had not been fulfilled by 1990, the LTBT States 
Parties convened an Amendment Conference at the United Nations (UN). The Mexican Working 
Paper ofAugust 24, 1990 captured the views ofmany NNWS participants at the Conference on the 
linkage between the CTBT and the NPT: 
A comprehensive test ban treaty would make the single most important contribu­
tion toward strengthening and extending the international barriers against the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons ... the continued testing of nuclear weapons by 
the nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty would put the future of the Non­
Proliferation Treaty beyond 1995 in grave doubt. 
This consideration was the driving force at the LTBT Conference behind the final vote of 
74 to 2 (the United States and United Kingdom against, with 19 abstentions) in January 1991 on 
the proposition that the "States Parties were of the view that further work needed to be undertaken. 
Accordingly, they agreed to ... resuming the work ofthe Conference at an appropriate time." To 
a large extent the NWSs' promise of a CTBT was the factor that convinced the NNWSs in May 
1995 to indefinitely extend the NPT-without dissent-and thus give up their sovereign right to 
develop nuclear weapons for all time. In order to strongly remind the NWSs of their CTBT prom­
ise, the 195 NPT States Parties adopted a set ofobjectives that politically committed them to con­
clude a CTBT "no later than 1996." In August 1995 France and the United States stated their 
intention to establish a "zero yield threshold" CTBT by seeking a complete ban on nuclear explo­
sions. This strengthening ofCTBT criteria clearly supports Article VI of the NPT, but the United 
States stated this commitment without linking it to the NPT. In September 1996, in a near unani­
mous vote of 158 to 3 (India, Bhutan, and Libya against), the UN General Assembly accepted the 
CTBT without amendment for signature. It is rare to find such a consonant momentum in global 
decision making on national security affairs. By December 1996 over 130 nations had signed the 
CTBT. 
Question 1.2: Comprehensive Test Ban TreatylNuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty World Norm 
How will the cmT and NPT affect the political will and internal debate of a state con­
sidering the option of starting a nuclear weapons program? How would the existence of a cmT 
in force affect the responses of the world's states to a nuclear weapon test by either a CTBT Party 
or by a non-CTBT Party? 
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Answer 12: 
Without a CTBT, it will be difficult to sustain the NPT, which discriminates between the 
"haves" (the nuclear weapon states) and the "have-nots" (the non-nuclear weapon states). Without 
both a CTBT and an NPT, it will be difficult for some national leaders to restrain calls to establish 
a nuclear weapons and testing program. If a state cannot test the nuclear research products of its 
scientists, it will be less likely to allow the development of the weapons in the first place. A viable 
CTBTINPT regime will strengthen international cooperation on proliferation by enhancing the 
IAEA, by enhancing export monitoring, and by supporting those who would foreclose the nuclear 
weapon option in their countries. In addition, the CTBTINPT regime strengthens the political will 
of the states of the world to establish harsh sanctions against any States Party that established 
nuclear weapons and testing programs. States Parties that have signed the CTBT, but have not yet 
ratified the Treaty, are obligated by Article 18 ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties to 
refrain from acts that would defeat a treaty's "object and purpose" in the intetval between signa­
ture and entry into force. Clearly this constrains the signatories from testing nuclear weapons even 
ifthe CTBT has not entered into force. 
Question 13: Constraints on the Non-nuclear Weapon States 
How does the CTBT constrain the technical nuclear capabilities of a non-nuclear weapon 
state? 
Answer 1.3: 
A relatively unsophisticated, first-generation nuclear weapon can be developed without 
testing, l but a state would not know with certainty its reliability and yield. If a state wished to 
have reliable, compact nuclear weapons for deployment on missiles, it is generally believed that 
testing would be required to secure this as a viable military option. If a state cannot test such 
weapons, it would be much less likely to develop them. 
In 1974 India tested a nuclear weapon, an act that greatly influenced the United States to 
tighten its nuclear export policies with the passage of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. 
It is generally believed that three legally defined NNWSs (as defined in Article IX.3 of the NPT) 
have nuclear weapons (Israel, India, and Pakistan). 
Most assume that it is necessary to test boosted primaries and hydrogen bombs to obtain a 
reliable, deliverable arsenal-in contrast to certain first-generation fission weapons. It would be 
easy to detect and identify tests ofhydrogen bombs and of full-scale boosted primaries, since such 
tests would produce a yield greater than 1 kiloton TNT equivalent. Thus the CTBr greatly 
constrains the three de-facto NWSs and the NNWSs from developing hydrogen bombs. 
Question 14: Nuclear Weapon State Positive andNegative Security Assurances 
What are the positive and negative security assurances offered by the nuclear weapon states 
in support of the 1995 NPT extension? . 
1 Eric Arnett, ed., Nuclear Weapons After the Comprehensive Test Ban (Oxford: SIPRI, Oxford 
University Press, 1996). 
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Answer 1.4: 
Positive· Security Assurances: The five NWSs declared they "would have to act immedi­
ately through the [UN Security] Council to take measures to counter such aggression or remove 
the threat of aggression.,,2 This type ofunspecified action is not legally binding. 
Negative Security Assurances: The five NWSs declared they would not use or threaten to 
use nuclear weapons against any NNWS party to the NPT except in the case of an attack (with 
conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction) by that NNWS on the NWS or its allies 
"carried out or sustained ... in alliance or association with a nuclear weapon-state.,,3 Since this 
specific lack ofaction was promised as part ofthe NPT renewal process, it is generally believed to 
be legally binding in accordance with the 1996 decision by the International Court ofJustice. 
n. NUCLEAR ARMS CON1ROL 
Conclusions: 
The CTBT is both a nonproliferation and an arms control treaty. The CTBT constrains the 
NWSs from augmenting their arsenals with further technical advances. For China, this means 
forgoing an advanced missile system equipped with multiple independently-targetable reentry 
vehicles (MIRVs). The United States and the Soviet Union conducted 85% of all nuclear tests, 
and thus have an advantage in residual knowledge over all other states on infonnation obtained 
from tests. The collapse ofRussia's nuclear infrastructure has produced a large U.S. lead in such 
residual knowledge. 
Banning nuclear testing reduces tensions between the NWSs; by contrast, conducting 
nuclear tests raises tensions. Without a CTBT one can expect other NWSs to begin testing anew. 
A global ban on testing was negotiated in the context of reductions in the numbers of U. S. and 
Russian deployed nuclear weapons. Under START II, the United States will retain over 9000 
warheads, with 3500 of them deployed and accountable. 
Question 11.1: Constraints on the Nuclear Weapon States 
If the nuclear weapon states do not test nuclear weapons, how does this constrain their 
plans to modernize with new, untested warheads? 
Answer 11.1: 
The U.S. force structure is adequate by almost any yardstick one can imagine when 
discussing possible missions; therefore the United States does not need to develop new types of 
nuclear weapons. By not being able to test, it is very unlikely that the NWSs will be able to 
develop and deploy new types of weapons, thus freezing the present levels of technology. For 
China, which has not yet deployed a viable, long-range MIRVed system, a CTBT would constrain 
such plans. Ifone NWS began to test, others would most likely follow. 
2 G. Bunn and R. Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States," Program for 
Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, no. 7 (September 1996), University of Southampton, UK. 
3 Bunn and Timerbaev, "Security Assurances to Non-Nuclear Weapon States." 
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Question IL2: Past Tests by the Nuclear Weapon States 
How much have the five nuclear weapon states tested in the past? 
Answer IL2: 
During 1962, the first year after the 195"8-61 testing moratorium, nuclear testing reached its 
maximum rate, with the United States conducting 96 tests and the Soviet Union 79. The United 
States last tested nuclear weapons in 1992 (6 times) and the Soviet Union last tested in 1990 
(once). The United States and the Soviet Union carried out 85% of all tests to date. Only the 
United States currently maintains its nuclear infrastructure with vigor. Listed below are the num­
ber and aggregate yields ofnuclear tests by the five NWSs. India conducted one underground test 
in 1974 with a yield of 10 kilotons. 
Table 10.1
 
Historical record ofnuclear testing by the five nuclear weapon states
 
Number of Percent of Yield (of all Yield (of all Yield 
Tests Total atmospheric) underground) (ofall tests) 
United States 1030 50.3 141 38 179 
USSR 715 34.9 247 38 285 
France 210 10.3 8 0.9 8.9 
United Kingdom 45 2.2 10 4 14 
China 45 2.2 21.9 1.5 23.4 
Total 2045 427.9 82.4 510.3 
Data shown in this table do not include the 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki explosions and the 1974 
Indian explosion. Yields are given in units of megatons (million of tons) high explosive (TNT) 
equivalent. 
Source: R. Norris and W. Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: Known Nuclear Tests World Wide, 
1945-1995," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 (M:ay/June 1996): 61-63; and "Factfile," Arms 
Control Today 26 (August 1996): 38. 
Question IL3: Relations between the Nuclear Weapon States under a Comprehensive Test Ban 
How could a CTBT reduce contentiousness among the five nuclear weapon states? 
Answer IL3: 
One would expect that a permanent ban on nuclear tests would improve relations between 
the five. NWSs by avoiding the following problems: (1) Since nuclear testing is in part a political 
act, testing by one NWS causes other NWS governments to respond politically, lest they appear to 
be weak to their own citizens. (2) Since nuclear testing is in part a technical act, it would be inter­
preted as a strengthening of the ability of one state to attack another. Therefore, if an NWS were 
to begin again to test nuclear weapons, the other NWSs would most likely resume their testing pro­
grams, for both political and technical reasons. 
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Question IL4: Nuclear Weapon State Nuclear Forces 
In order to assess the military implications ofthe strategic balance between the five nuclear 
weapon states, what are their present and planned nuclear force structures? 
Answer IL4: 
Under present planning, the total number of nuclear weapons will drop from 1991 numbers 
of about 23,000 for the United States and about 38,000 for the Soviet Union to perhaps about 
10,000 each under START II. The data below cover the weapons that can be launched on a 
moment's notice plus nondeployed nuclear weapons. 
Table 10.2
 
Numbers of strategic, non-strategic, and non-deployed warheads comprising
 
the nuclear forces ofthe United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China
 
Total Non- Reserve/ 
ICBM SLBM Bomber Strategic Strategic Inactive Total 
U.S. (9/90) 2450 5760 4508 12,718 7100 3400 23,000 
U.S. (10/96) 2090 3264 3048 8402 1200 7100 17,000 
U.S. (START I) 1400 3456 3000 7856 950 5000 14,000 
U.S. (START II) 500 1680 1320 3500 950 5000 9,000 
USSR (9/90) 6612 2804 1363 10,779 11,000 16,000 38,000 
Russia (10/96) 3577 2272 820 6669 4400 9000 20,000 
Russia (START 1) 2960 1840 1000 5800 2750 5000 14,000 
Russia (START IT) 605 1696 800 3101 2750 5000 11,000 
U.K. (1996) 160 0 160 100 n.a. 260 
France (1996) °0 384 0 384 65 n.a. 449 
China (1996) 7 12 0 19 376 n.a. 395 
The notation "n.a." indicates that the data are not available to the author, or not yet determined. 
Totals for the U.S., USSR and Russia were rounded to the nearest 1000 to reflect uncertainty in the 
nonstrategic and reserve categories. 
Source: R. Norris and W. Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, 
July 1996," Bulletin ofthe Atomic Scientists 52 (July/August 1996): 61-63; and "NRDC Nuclear 
Notebook: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Forces," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 52 
(NovemberlDecember 1996): 64-67; J. Mendelsohn and C. Cerniello, "Factfile," Arms Control 
Today 26 (October 1966): 28-29; START Memoranda ofUnderstanding; J. Cirincione (Henry L. 
Stimson Center), private communication; The Military Balance 1994-1995, published by Brassey's 
(UK) Ltd. for the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1994; START Treaty, Senate 
Executive Report 102-5, September 18, 1992; and START II Treaty, Senate Executive Report 
104-10, December 15, 1995. 
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The 1994 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review sets aside some 2500 "hedge" weapons to upload 
the Minuteman ills from one to three warheads, to upload the Trident SLBMs (submarine­
launched ballistic missiles) from five to eight warheads, and to add warheads to the B-52H and 
B-1 bombers. In addition, the review states that the United States should maintain some 2,500 
"inactive" weapons, which have their tritium removed but are intact and available for future 
deployment. Thus, the U.S. total under START IT is over 9,000 warheads: 4450 deployed (or able 
to be deployed on short notice) and about 5000 that could be deployed after systems are modified 
to accept them in a period ofa months to a few years. 
m. WARHEAD RELIABILITY 
Conclusions: 
The JASON Study and the U.S. nuclear-weapon laboratory directors have certified that the 
u.s. stockpile is now reliable and safe. Both agree that the Stockpile Stewardship and Manage­
ment Program should be able to maintain this status without nuclear testing. In the unlikely event 
that this is not true or does not continue to be true, the United States can withdraw from the CTBT 
under its "supreme national interest" clause. 
This section first discusses the JASON Study conclusions, warhead designs in the present 
U.S. arsenal, and the historical contrast of the 1958-61 moratorium. The definition and analysis of 
warhead reliability is then examined, including the Department ofEnergy (DOE) warhead defect 
data and the critical, related issue ofmissile reliability. Of the missions to which the U.S. nuclear 
forces could be tasked, a first strike against another NWS requires the highest degree of weapon 
reliability. 
Question IlL J: The Technical Assessment of the JASONStudy 
What did the JASON Study conclude in 1995 on the necessity for further nuclear testing to 
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent? 
Answer III 1: 
For many years the JASON Group, composed ofindependent, senior, non-government sci­
entists, has advised the U.S. Departments ofDefense and Energy on technical aspects of national 
security issues. The unanimous report from the group of 14 prominent scientists, including four 
DOE weapon designers, concluded that (in brief): (1) The JASON Committee has high confidence 
in the safety, reliability, and performance margins of the present U. S. nuclear stockpile, which will 
continue to be needed for deterrence. (2) The United States can maintain the quality of its nuclear 
weapons with the Science-Based Stockpile ~tewardship and Management Program, which does 
not include nuclear testing. (3) The range of performance margins of the weapons is adequate at 
this time, and changes should be made to a weapon type only under extreme circumstances. 
(4) Continued testing under 500 tons TNT equivalent would only marginally assure the quality of 
the weapons, and much less so than the Stockpile Stewardship Program. (5) Experiments with 
high explosives and fissionable material that do not reach criticality are useful in improving our 
understanding of the behavior of weapon materials. (6) In the past, probl,ems that occurred were 
primarily the result ofincomplete or inadequate design activities. The JASON Group is convinced 
that those problems have been corrected and that the weapon types in the enduring stockpile are 
safe and reliable in the context of explicit military requirements. (7) The above conclusions are
. 
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consistent with the CTBT, recalling the fact that the United States has the option to withdraw 
under conditions of"supreme national interest."4 
Question III. 2: U.S" Nuclear Warheads in the Enduring Arsenal 
What warheads will be in the "enduring" U.S. force structure after 2003, and what are the 
presently planned quantities, type, yield, date of introduction into the stockpile, and laboratory 
custodianship. 
Answer III. 2: 
Table 10.3
 
Warhead designs comprising the U.S. arsenal after the year 2003.
 
Lead laboratories are Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL)
 
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL)
 
Date Introduced Lab with 
Design Number Type Yield . in Arsenal Custodianship 
B61/4, B61111 600 tactical bomb 170 kt 1980 LANL 
B6117 750 strategic bomb 300 kt 1986 LANL 
B83 650 strategic bomb 1.2Mt 1983 LLNL 
W62 610 :MM: ill (ICBM) 170 kt 1970 LANL 
W76 3000 Trident C4 (SLBM) 100 kt 1979 LANL 
W78. 920 :MM: ill (ICBM) 335 kt 1980 LANL 
W80/1 1400 ALCM* 150 let 1981 LANL 
W8010 350 SLCM* 150 kt 1984 LANL 
W84 400 GLCM* 50 kt 1983 LLNL 
W87 525 MX(ICBM) 300 kt 1986 LLNL 
W88 400 Trident D5 (SLBM) 475 kt 1988 LANL 
*The W80/1, W8010, and W84 warheads were designed for deployment on air-launched cruise 
missiles (ALCMs), sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), and ground-launched cruise missiles 
(GLCM), respectively. 
Source: Norris and Arkin, "NRDC Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, July 
1996." 
Question 111.3: 1958-61 Testing Moratorium.~ the Modernization Era 
Were there large technical changes to then relatively new types of U. S. warheads during 
the 1958-61 testing moratorium? How is the situation different in 1997? 
4 "Nuclear Testing," Jason Report #JSR-95-320, Mitre Corporation, McLean, VA (August 3, 
1995). 
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Answer IlL 3: 
Major, impressive changes were taking place in the U.S. nuclear arsenal when the morato­
rium of 1958 was established: (1) The hydrogen bomb technology was then relatively new (the 
first deliverable thermonuclear weapon was tested in 1954). Several years were required to deploy 
smaller hydrogen bombs. (2) The first boosted primaries were tested in 1955. (3) In 1955, com­
pact, light warheads assembled with sealed pits and deployable on missiles required new designs 
providing for one-point safety. 
In contrast to the 1958-61 moratorium, the United States now has had an additional 35 
years and a total of 1000 tests to attain its present nuclear stockpile, which has not changed signifi­
cantly in design for a number ofyears. 
Question IlL4: U.S. Department ofEnergy Definition ofReliability 
What is DOE's definition ofreliability for nuclear weapons? 
Answer IlL 4: 
"In general tenns, reliability is defined as the ability of an item to perfonn a required func­
tion. Implicit in the above definition of 'required function' for one-shot devices, such as nuclear 
weapons, are the required conditions and duration of storage, transportation, and function. Also 
implicit in the above definition of 'ability' is the concept of successful perfonnance. Successful 
performance for nuclear weapons is defined as detonation at the desired yield (or higher) at the 
target (i.e., desired burst height or desired delay time within the desired CEP [circular error proba­
bility]) through either the primary or any designed backup mode of operation.,,5 
Question IlL 5: Reliability Tests 
How reliable are U.S. nuclear weapons? Has the United States performed enough nuclear 
tests to prove that its warheads are, say, 90% reliable with 90% confidence? 
Answer IlL5: 
There have not been enough perfonnance nuclear tests to establish a statistical reliability 
value with great confidence for any specific warhead type in the enduring arsenal. For example, if 
ten perfonnance tests were carried out and all were successful, there would still be a 30% chance 
that the weapon would be less than 90% reliable, and a 10% chance that it would be less than 80% 
reliable.6 
In the years when the United States tested some 20 times per year only one or two tests 
were for reliability. Considering that the United States has had some 30-40 different warheads 
types, there has clearly not been sufficient nuclear reliability testing to quote a reliability value 
even with a medium level of confidence for a particular warhead type, and certainly not as a func­
tion of time for warheads deployed more than two years. 
S H. Zerriffi and A. Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen: Warhead Safety and Reliability and 
the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program," Institute for Energy-Environmental Research, 
Takoma Park, MD (May 1996). 
6 S. Fetter, Toward a Comprehensive Test Ban (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988). 
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In general, non-explosive tests have been the most important way to determine the status of 
warheads. This is particularly true for warheads that have been in the stockpile for over two years. 
Question IlL 6: Actionable Defect Types 
What is the DOE record of"actionable defect types" associated with the safety and reliabil­
ity problems for the u.s. weapon stockpile? 
Answer 111.6: 
Since the Department ofEnergy has built over 50,000 warheads, the operational and main­
tenance record gives indications of possible future problems with warheads. According to DOE, 
an "actionable defect type (AnT) is defined as a defect type which reduces the reliability assess­
ment for the nuclear weapon in which it occurs or which results in some action to remedy the de­
fect type or prevent future occurrence of the defect type. Often a defect type is interdicted before 
enough infonnation (sufficient number of occurrences) has been collected to indicate that the 
reliability should be reduced. Therefore, not all ADTs have an associated reliability reduction."7 
In response to a freedom of infonnation request, DOE stated that of the 164 ADTs, they 
had the following distribution of reduced reliability (AR): O<.6.R<I% (112 ADTs); 1%<L\R<5% 
(37); 5%<L\R<10% (6), and 10%<.6.R<100% (9).8 However, DOE states that they cannot specify 
the absolute reliability R because DOE does not carry out sufficient nuclear tests to do this. 
After looking at the ADT data, I have reached the following conclusions: (1) Older war­
heads that had generic problems have been retired. This was particularly true for the early 
warheads at the time of the 1958-61 moratorium. (2) Aging has not affected the safety ofthe war­
heads. The aging effects on reliability of current warheads were in the arming/firing/safeing, the 
parachute, the gas transfer, and the neutron generator systems. None of these problems needed 
nuclear testing to resolve them. (3) The primary is much more sensitive than the secondary. The 
problems with primaries have been design or production problems, which mostly show up within 
a few years of entrance into the stockpile. Generic problems have been solved over time and can 
be monitored in the future without nuclear testing. Under a finding that there is a threat to the 
"supreme national interest," the United States can always withdraw from the CTBT. (4) If one 
uses a realistic mission-oriented values for reliability and yield, aging is not likely to be a factor 
for the weapons over their lifetimes. If, to save money, one wishes to extend the lifetimes of the 
warheads from, say, 20 years to 40 years, then the weapons will have to be monitored closely. 
(5) Non-nuclear testing is far more cost effective than nuclear testing to detennine the statistics of 
the fraction of the stockpile affected by a potential problem. 
Question III. 7: Missile Reliability 
For U.S. nuclear weapon systems, do the missiles or warheads have the larger failure rate? 
Answer III 7: 
The reliability of a warhead is generally concluded to be greater than the reliability of a 
missile to arrive on target with good accuracy. If, for example, the reliability of a missile is 0.9 
7 Zerriffi. and Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen." 
S Zerriffi and Makhijani, "The Nuclear Smokescreen." 
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and that of a warhead is 0.95, the missile would have twice the failure rate (F) of the warhead 
[F(mi~sile) / F(warhead) = (1 .0.9) / (1 ·0.95) =0.1/0.05 = 2], producing twice as many missile 
failures as warhead failures. For the case of 97.5% warhead reliability and 0.9 missile reliability, 
the missile failure rate is four times that of the warheads. The lower bound of missile reliability 
used by the Congressional Budget Office was 0.8, a value that gives failure rate ratios twice as 
high as those quoted above.9 The most significant improvement to the reliability of the entire 
weapon would be to increase missile reliability. 
Question III8: Competence o/Weapon Designers 
Assessments of the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons will often require judgment 
calls based on experience. How will the United States maintain the continuing competence of 
weapon designers under a CTBT? 
Answer III 8: 
It is widely expected that shifting the emphasis of the DOE's nuclear weapons program to 
non-testing, science-based methods will be very effective for the mature stockpile. Many new 
diagnostic tools such as the National Ignition Facility will be developed at the three weapons labs 
and at the Nevada Test Site. Supercomputers with thousands of times the present speed and 
memory will be used for three-dimensional simulations of nuclear explosions. Lastly, subcritical 
hydronuclear tests will allow the weapon designers continued opportunities to maintain their skills. 
Question III9: Performance Enhancements 
Is it possible to enhance the reliability of aging primaries beyond their design lifetimes in 
order to save money? 
Answer 111.9: 
By increasing the amount of tritium in the primary, extra boosting is obtained to further 
ensure that a very old primary could still trigger the associated secondary. In this way the reliabil­
ity of older weapons can be enhanced to reduce the frequency of remanufacture, and thus save 
money.10 
Question IIllO: Purpose ofReliability 
The United States will have approximately 3500 accountable strategic warheads under 
START n, and more than twice that number under START I. Consider four hypothetical 
scenarios: an attack against the United States by an NWS,an attack against the United States by an 
NNWS, a u.s. first strike against an NWS, and a U.S. first strike against an NNWS. Which 
scenario requires the highest level of reliability? 
9 U.S. Congress, Trident II Missiles: Capability, Costs, and Alternatives (Washington, DC: Con­
gressional Budget Office, July 1986). 
10 ''Nuclear Testing," Jason Report #JSR-95-320. 
as 
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Answer III 10: 
The highest reliability requirement would be for a first strike against an NWS to minimize 
the response--a second strike. A U. S. retaliation to a first strike by an NWS would not have to be 
as reliable because many of the enemy silos would then be empty and because cities are soft tar­
gets. A U.S. first strike against an NNWS would not require very reliable weapons since the stra­
tegic targets are few and soft. Of course the United States has given negative security assurances 
that we would not launch first against an NNWS (except in a special case; see Answer 1.4). A U.S. 
nuclear response to an NNWS attack would not require great reliability because the targets are soft 
and few and the launchers would be empty. Since nuclear weapons are meant to deter the actions 
of others, it is the perception of high reliability by other nations (and not'the actual reliability) that 
deters nations. What is the most important purpose ofreliability? It is ironic that the highest level 
of reliability needed would be for a first strike and not for a deterrent second strike. 
IV. WARHEAD SAFETY 
Conclusions: 
U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons have to date been very safe, as no one has been killed by 
nuclear yield from weapons accidents since 1945 in over one million nuclear-weapon-years of 
experience by the Americans and the Soviets. Since bombers no longer fly with nuclear weapons, 
the most dangerous cause of accidents has been removed. The cost per life saved of replacing 
existing warheads with new designs is many orders of magnitude higher than what is normally 
spent in medical practice or safety regulations. Officials from both the Reagan and Bush adminis­
trations have testified that potential safety problems were not severe enough to build new war­
heads and missiles. For these reasons, the issue of further testing for safety has disappeared from 
the CTBT debate. 
Question IV.i: Accidents with Nuclear Weapons 
What significant accidents have occurred involving U.S. nuclear weapons since World War 
II? Were there radioactive releases, and were people injured or killed from the radioactivity? 
Answer IV.1: 
According to the DOE there have been 32 accidents (31 prior to 1968 and one in 1980) 
involving U. S. nuclear weapons. 11 None of these resulted in a nuclear detonation or any nuclear 
yield despite severe stresses on the weapons. Only two accidents-at Palomares, Spain in 1966 
and Thule, Greenland in 1968-released significant amounts of radioactivity. All but three of the 
32 accidents involved aircraft, which no longer fly with puclear weapons aboard. Of the three 
nonaircraft accidents, the accident at an igloo storage in Texas released little contamination and the 
two accidents with ICBMs released no radioactivity. No one has been killed by radiation expo­
sure, and doses have not been significant over some one-million weapon years of American and 
Soviet nuclear weapon experience. 
11 S. Drell and B. Peurifoy, "Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban," Annual Review ofNuclear 
andParticle Science 44 (1994): 285-327. 
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Question IV. 2: How Safe is Safe? 
What is the DOE criteria for a "safe" nuclear weapon? 
Answer IV. 2: 
DOE defines "safe" as the probability of less than a one-in-a-billion chance per warhead 
life of prematurely detonating with a yield of more than four pounds of TNT (nuclear equivalent) 
prior to launch under normal conditions and less than one-in-a-million per accident under abnor­
mal conditions such as a fire or a crash. Two independent strong links, each with a failure rate of. 
111,000 in an accident, gives the one-in-a-million figure. 12 One link uses a read-only chip to arm 
the weapon and the other requires a zero gravity trajectory. 
Question IV.3: Safety Features and CostlBenefit Analysis ofSafety 
What features can be added to warheads to make them safe? What are the costs and bene­
fits of replacing the U. S. stockpile with new, safer weapons? 
Answer IV. 3: 
The three enhanced safety improvements that can be added to warheads in the enduring 
U.S. nuclear arsenal are: insensitive high explosives, fire-resistant pits and enhanced nuclear deto­
nation safety (ENDS, which isolates electrical systems in an accident).13 These, and many other of 
the 1990 Drell Nuclear Safety Report recommendations, have been implemented in some systems, 
such as the procedure for loading Trident missiles without warheads and only then emplacing the 
warheads. 14 
The Drell report did not take into account the costs of new warheads and missiles versus 
the potential health benefit from their recommendations. In 1992, W. Isard calculated that it would 
take about $200 million to save a (statistical) life if the United States were to modernize the 
arsenal with safer warheads and missiles,ls This figure is about 1,000 times more costly to save a 
life than what is spent for some expensive medical procedures. During my tenure at the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, I was told by Los Alamos in 1992 that they estimated a comparable 
value of about $300 million to save a life. The Weapon Safety Value Assessment (WESVA) deci­
sion tool is used to estimate the probability and severity ofvarious accident scenarios. Because the 
estimated costlbenefit ratios appeared very high, the Hatfield-Exon-Mitchell Act of 1992 required 
the President to carry out "an analysis of the costs and benefits ofinstalling such [safety] feature or 
12 S. Drell and B. Peurifoy, "Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban." 
13 Drell and Peurifoy, "Technical Issues of a Nuclear Test Ban"; and R. Kidder, "Assessment ofthe 
Safety of U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Related Nuclear Test Requirements," Lawrence Liverm~re 
National Laboratory, Livermore, CA, UCRL-LR-107454 (July 26, 1991). 
14 U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, "Nuclear Weapons Safety: Report of the Panel on 
Nuclear Weapons Safety of the Committee on Armed Services," 101st Cong., 2nd sess., December 
1990. 
15 W. Isard, "An Economic Analysis of the Costs and Benefits ofEnding the U.S. Nuclear Testing 
Moratorium," Economists Alliedfor Arms Reduction, New York, 1992. 
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features in the warhead" before he could carry out nuclear tests on new warheads with enhanced 
safety features. This law did not set a dollar level for the cost/benefit ratio, it merely mandated 
that the calculations be done. 
The Isard values may be too low in that they use the Fetter and von Hippel probability of 
0.1 percent per year rate, which is based on the two large plutoilium releases from accidents with 
U.S. aircraft. 16 I would agree with former Assistant Secretary ofEnergy Claytor, who argued that 
extrapolating from two aircraft accidents exaggerates the risks since our bombers no longer fly 
with nuclear weapons in peacetime. In addition, when one considers that no lives have been lost 
after a million weapon-years of American and Soviet experience, and that these warheads were 
less safe than the present ones, I believe that the $200 million cost per life saved is considerably 
too low. 
Question IV. 4: Military Views on Testingfor Safety 
How do the Navy and Air Force view the benefits ofpossible major safety modifications ,to 
U.S. warheads? 
Answer IV. 4: 
Officials from both the Bush and Clinton Defense Departments have testified that potential 
safety problems were not severe enough to build new warheads and missiles. 
Robert Barker, Assistant to the Secretary ofDefense (Atomic Energy), before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, March 27, 1992: 
The AirForce and Navy, in cooperation with the Office ofthe Secretary ofDefense 
and the Department of Energy, evaluated the safety of all ballistic missiles that 
carry nuclear warheads. It was determined that there is not now sufficient evidence 
to warrant our changing either warheads or propellants. 
Undersecretary of Defense John Deutch, before the House Armed Services Committee, Military 
Application ofNuclear Energy Panel, May 3, 1993: . 
[A]s chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council ... I would think that we are not 
convinced that such safety improvement [i.e., adding insensitive high explosive to 
the Trident warheads and modifying the missile] would be worth the very consid­
erable cost [ofover three billion dollars]. 
Rear Admiral John T. Mitchell, Director, Strategic Systems Program Office, U.S. Navy, before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Anns Control and 
Defense Intelligence, May 11, 1993: 
16 S.Fetter and F. von Hippel, "The Hazard from Plutonium Dispersal by Nuclear-warhead Acci­
dents," Science and Global Security 2 (1990): 21-41. 
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[W]e believe there would be no gain in safety in changing to insensitive high explo­
sive [on the W88 warhead in the event of a third stage detonation of the Trident 
D-5 missile]. 
V. VERIFICATION 
Conclusions: 
The combination of the near real-time Primary Seismic Network, the Auxiliary Seismic 
Network of broad-band triple-axis seismographs, and regional seismic monitoring stations will be 
able to detect and identity fully-coupled nuclear explosions down to a yield of one kiloton TNT 
equivalent. In many geographical regions the detection threshold is considerably better than one 
kiloton, and global capabilities will improve with time. The CTBT verification regime can adapt 
to changing political conditions by focusing on areas where nuclear proliferation is suspected. 
Attempted clandestine testing by exploding at the one kiloton level in a cavity would only be 
attempted by a very technologically sophisticated state, since yield excursions, venting, detection 
by national technical means, and other issues arise. 
Question J/:l: Seismic Capabilities . 
What are the seismic capabilities of the PrimaryNetwork of 50 stations, the Auxiliary Net­
work of 120 broad-band, three-component seismograph stations, and the regional networks? 
Answer J/:l: 
Using all of the seismic capabilities available, nuclear explosions will be detected with 
high confidence (90% certainty) down to seismic magnitudes (mb) ofabout 4. This magnitude cor­
responds to that of a tamped explosion ofabout 1 kiloton in hard rock. However, this assessment 
is too cautious in that it does not take into account the combination of teleseismic stations (more 
than 2200 Ian away) with the regional stations. By combining the capabilities of the Primary, 
Auxiliary, and regional networks (now available in many locations), one can improve the detection 
threshold to about 3 mb, corresponding to a nuclear explosion with a yield of mere tenths of a 
kiloton. The more open process ofCTBT monitoring by many nations should incorporate the sup­
plemental data from regional seismographs to reduce the CTBT measuring threshold and improve 
the location determinations. 
The teleseismic mb level to identify an event as a nuclear weapon and not an earthquake is 
generally about 0.5 units higher than the detection threshold. Model calculations carried out at 
Sandia National Laboratory by Claassen show that the Primary Network of 50 stations should have 
a detection threshold range of3.25 to 3.5 ~ in central Eurasia, and below 4 ~ for the remainder 
of the Earth (except for Antarctica and some southern islands, where it is 4.25 mb).17 Claassen 
required that three or more stations detect seismic P-wave (primus) arrivals with a 99% 
probability. This detection criterion was specifically used because it admits only a 1% probability 
in missed detection, as opposed to the more conventionally used 10% value. It should be noted 
17 J.P. Claassen, "Performance Estimates of the CD Proposed International Seismic Monitoring 
System," 18th Annual Seismic Research Symposium on Monitoring a CTBr (4-6 September 1996), 
Environmental Research Papers, No. 1195, pp. 676-84. 
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that in a recent study the detection threshold ofregional seismic networks near the Nevada test site 
was about 2.4 lllt" about 1.5 units lower than that for the more distant teleseismic systems (ffit> =4) 
for now-known, previously undeclared nuclear explosions. IS If there is a suspicious region, a 
neighboring state can place a regional seismograph close to the suspected region and the ability to 
monitor will improve. Finally, large chemical explosions are readily detectable since they are 
generally not spherical explosions, but rather ripple-fired in a linear array in order to greatly 
reduce costs for breaking rock and to reduce off-site damage. In order to lessen misunder­
standings, there will be voluntary notifications ofchemical explosions larger than 0.3 kilotons. 
Question V.2: High Confidence andDeterrence 
The error bars discussed above for threshold seismic values are usually quoted in terms of 
high confidence limits, with a confidence of90%. What do these higher confidence levels mean in 
terms of the threshold levels for the detection of nuclear weapons and for psychological deter­
rence? 
Answer V.2: 
The U. S. Intelligence Community quotes higher threshold mb values (larger yields) in order 
to claim "high confidence." One usually describes the limits of measurement, the error bars, as 
one standard deviation (0), but for the case of "high confidence" one insists that some 90% ofthe 
events are discovered, which corresponds to two standard deviations. If the confidence level were 
lowered to about 50%, then the threshold level would be reduced by about 0.5 for regions with 
good seismic coverage and by 0.25 for regions with poorer coverage. It probably is useful to quote 
higher lllt, thresholds with more certainty, since would-be cheaters would know that a 90% chance 
ofidentification corresponds to only a 10% probability ofnot being identified. 
Question V. 3: Cavities 
How easy would it be for a nation to hide a nuclear explosion in a cavity?19 What diameter 
cavity would be needed to decouple (muffle) a nuclear explosion of 1 or 30 kilotons? What are the 
technical risks for the covert tester? 
Answer V.3: 
There are very few data on decoupled tests in cavities; only one has been carried out with 
a yield greater than one kiloton. If a nuclear weapon is placed in a cavity of sufficient size, such 
that the blast pressure on the cavity wall is below the elastic limit of the surrounding media, the 
seismic signal strength can be reduced by a factor of about 7 at 20 Hz, and 70 at lower frequencies. 
(The Soviet test at Azgir had a reduction of only a factor of lOin magnitude at low frequencies.) 
The cavity size necessary to obtain these decoupling factors has a radius of 20-25 meters per 
cube-root kiloton. Thus, a 30 let explosion would need a cavity radius of 60-75 m (the size ofa 25 
18 C. Hennet, G.E. van der Vink, P.G. Richards, v.v. Adushkin, Y.F. Kopnichev, and R. Geary, 
"Multi-Use Seismic Stations Offer Strong Deterrent to Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Testing," 
EOS, 77 (July 30, 1996): 289. 
19 L. Sykes, in Monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, E. Husebye and A. Dainty, eds. 
(Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), pp. 247-93. 
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story building) to achieve full decoupling-an extraordinary engineering challenge when one 
considers the requirement for secrecy. Many experts have concluded that the higher frequencies of 
the decoupled signal would still be detectable and identifiable with regional seismographs. If a 1 
let weapon had an unexpected yield of 5 let, which is quite possible for a new, clandestine program, 
it would require a cavity radius of35-45 meters (diameter of 70-90 meters), a factor of 1.7 larger 
than for the 1 let cavity (a volume 5 times greater). 
The tester's problems would be further complicated by possible venting of radioactivity, 
which could be easily detected; 30% of Soviet tests vented and the United States had severe 
venting problems with its earliest tests.20 In particular, it appears that smaller tests can be harder to 
contain than larger ones. The last four U.S. explosions that vented were from tests with yields of 
less than 20 kilotons. It is hypothesized that smaller explosions do not sufficiently glassify the 
cavity and also do not rebound sufficiently to close fractures with a stress cage. Thus, the smaller 
explosions, which one might think were easier to hide, are more likely to vent and could be 
detected by the release ofradioactivity. For these same reasons, it is further hypothesized that par­
tially decoupled tests would also be difficult to completely contain. 
Other intelligence means, such as satellites and electronic intelligence gathering, can also 
gather evidence on brine pumping, excavation, equipment for monitoring tests, and other factors. 
Only a very technologically sophisticated nation could conduct that a clandestine test of a kiloton 
(or larger) that was decoupled to a degree that enabled the test to escape detection by seismic 
means and that did not have yield excursions and venting. 
Question 11: 4: Infrasound, Hydroacoustics, Radionuclide, Electromagnetic Pulse, National Tech­
nical Means, and On-Site Inspection Monitoring 
What monitoring technologies other than seismic exist to determine CTBT compliance? 
Answer 11:4: 
.The International Monitoring System will also incorporate 60 infrasound stations (global 
threshold detection of about 1 kiloton in the atmosphere), 11 hydroacoustic stations (global detec­
tion ofmuch less than a kiloton in the ocean), and 80 radionuclide stations (global detection ofless 
than 1 kiloton in the atmosphere, and capabilities to detennine venting from underground explo­
sions). In addition the United States presently monitors with satellites for optical electromagnetic 
pulse (EMP) and nuclear radiation signatures from nuclear weapon tests above the surface of the 
earth. In addition the national technical means (NTM) of satellite reconnaissance, human intelli­
gence, and signals intelligence will combine synergistically to make the intelligence whole greater 
than the sum of its parts both to deter cheating and to enhance detection and identification. 
States Parties can call for an on-site inspection (OSI) to examine the location of a suspi­
cious event. If a nation were considering testing a nuclear weapon, it would have to be confident 
that it would have sufficient internal security to prevent knowledge of the test from being obtained 
by all these technologies and the intelligence community of any State Party to the CTBT. A 50% 
chance of detection of a sub-kiloton test might seem like weak monitoring to the CrnT States 
Parties, but it would seem like a risky endeavor to the cheating nation. On-site inspections are 
20 Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment, "Seismic Verification of 
Nuclear Testing Treaties," OTA-ISC-361, 1988~ and "The Containment of Underground Nuclear 
Explosions," OTA-ISC-414, 1989. 
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useful for at least four reasons: OSls can (1) catch cheating, (2) raise the cost ofcheating, (3) deter 
cheating, and (4) confirm NTM data. A guilty nation probably would not allow an OSI to take 
place, but this refusal, coupled with other evidence, would indicate guilt. 
VI. VERIFICATION-COMPLIANCE PROCESS 
Conclusions 
The definition of"effective verification," as defined by Paul Nitze of the Reagan adminis­
tration and James Baker of the Bush administration, includes the criteria ofmilitary significance of 
potential violations and timely warning to overcome such military threats. By this definition, the 
CTBT is clearly verifiable. The CTBT States Parties have legal mechanisms to strongly sanction 
(as in the case ofIraq) those States Parties that violate the CTBT by conducting nuclear test explo­
sions. 
Question Vll: Effective Verification 
How much verification is enough? What was the definition of"effective verification" used 
by the Reagan and Bush administrations when establishing the criteria to determine the sufficiency 
ofverification? 
Answer VI. 1: 
In 1988 Ambassador Paul Nitze defined "effective verification" as follows: 
What do we mean by "effective" verification? We mean that we want to be sure 
that if the other side moves beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily signifi­
cant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to respond effectively 
and thereby deny the other side the benefit ofthe violation.21 , 
In 1992 Secretary of State James Baker expanded the definition of"effective verification" to be: 
If the other side attempts to move beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily 
significant way, we would be able to detect such a violation well before it becomes 
a threat to national security so that we are able to respond. Additionally, the verifi­
cation regime should enable us to detect patterns ofmarginal violations that do not 
present immediate risk to U.S. security. However, no verification regime can be 
expected to provide firm guarantees that all violations will be detected imme­
diately.22 
Nitze points out that verification cannot be expected to catch all forms ofcheating, but that it must 
be good enough to detect a violation in time to allow the United States to make a military response 
before the violation becomes militarily significant. Baker echoes this definition, but points out· 
21 START Treaty, Senate Executive Report. 
22 START Treaty, Senate Executive Report. 
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that verification should also be able to detennine patterns of marginal misbehavior. It makes logi­
cal sense to apply this same standard for the quality ofverification to the CTBT. 
Question VI.2: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty vs. the Threshold Test Ban Treaty 
In what ways is it easier (and harder) to determine treaty compliance to the CTBT than the 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)? 
Answer VI. 2: 
By quantitying a specific yield threshold in kilotons, one must be able to accurately deter­
mine the conversion from fit, units to kilotons. This was initially a difficult task at 150 kilotons for 
the TTBT. Since the CTBT does not have a limit in kilotons, the question is easier, since it is not 
What is the particular yield?, but rather, Was it a nuclear explosion? On the other hand, at levels 
less than a kiloton down to zero, the seismic monitoring becomes more difficult. At this point, the 
national technical means (NTM) of verification, using satellites, intercepts of phone calls, apd 
other means, come into play. 
Question VI.3: Threshold Test Ban Treaty Compliance 
In 1990 the Administration reversed' its finding that the Soviets had likely violated the 
TTBT. What were the 1990 and subsequent findings on this issue? 
Answer VI. 3: 
The primary confusion on the TTBT compliance issues was caused by the (now) incorrect 
government estimate ofthe seismic bias factor, which takes into account the geological differences 
between the United States and former Soviet test sites. The U.S. test site in Nevada is on newer 
geological strata that better absorb the seismic waves, reducing the fit, values. On the other hand, 
the Soviet site in Kazakhstan is on older geological strata, which absorb much less seismic 
strength, giving larger mb values. Thus, weapons with the same yield produce explosions with 
higher ~ values at the Soviet site than at the American site. This was interpreted as excessive 
Soviet yields beyond the 150 kiloton TTBT limit, with the charge that the Soviets had "likely" 
violated the TTBT. U.S. geophysicists had long predicted the "bias" difference between the sites 
would give a false reading in this manner. In 1988 the Joint Verification Experiment was carried. 
out by using Corrtex measurements at the two sites. These measurements convinced the executive 
branch that the geophysicists were correct on the value of the bias between the two sites. Finally 
in 1990, the Bush administration reversed the former finding of a "likely" violation. This reversal 
allowed the TTBT to be ratified and entered into force, and the CTBT negotiations to begin. 
Question VI.4: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Violation 
If a CTBT States Party is suspected of having tested a nuclear weapon, what recourse do 
the other CTBT States Parties have? How would the international process move forward? 
Answer VI.4: 
The data from the International Monitoring System (IMS) and NTM data (consistent with 
international law-no data from spying) will be transferred to the International Data Center. 
These data are open to all States Parties, who individually must first come to their own conclusions 
on the meaning of the data as the IMS does not make compliance findings. Each States Party has 
the right to request an on-site inspection on the territory of the suspected nation. The Executive 
-----
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Council of51 nations must respond within 96 hours. At least 30 ofthe 51 members ofthe Council 
must vote affinnatively for the OSI to go forward. For the case of a possible violation of the 
CTBT, the Conference of all the States Parties will determine if a state is in noncompliance with 
the CTBT, and determine collective measures that are in conformity with international law. Alter-
natively, the Conference or the Executive Council may bring the issue, including relevant infor-
mation and conclusions to the attention of the United Nations for resolution and action. As in the 
case of the 1991 Middle East War, the UN can impose harsh sanctions on a violator such as Iraq. 
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